

# 712CD

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# **Air Education and Training Command**

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***Replenishing the Combat Capability of America's Air Force***

## **Public Resolve: The Casualty of the 'Long War'**



**U.S. AIR FORCE**

**Maj Michael J. Artelli**

**Dr. Richard F. Deckro**

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**Col Daniel J. Zalewski, PhD**

**Maj Sonia Leach, PhD**

**MORSS Presentation**

**June 2007**


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***Integrity - Service - Excellence***



# Overview




- Problem Description
- Modeling Public Resolve
  - Simple Linear Regression
  - Mueller Model
  - Multiple Linear Regression
  - Generalized Linear Regression
    - Logistic Regression
- Implications and Future Research
- Conclusions

*There are two powers in the world, the sword and the spirit.  
In the end the spirit will always conquer the sword. — Napoleon Bonaparte*



# Problem Description




## Shifts of emphasis from 2006 QDR

- From nation-state threats
  - to non-state enemies
- From war against nations
  - to war in countries we are not at war with
- From major conventional combat operations
  - to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations
- From static post-operations analysis
  - to dynamic diagnostics and real-time lessons learned
- From “one size fits all” deterrence
  - to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks  
& near-peer competitors

2006 QDR: Pages vi & vii

*Baghdad is the center of gravity in Iraq, and the **American people are the center of gravity for our enemies.** And what the American people believe and the American people's ability to sustain -- **what they must sustain to defeat this enemy is what our enemies are trying to influence.** – Gen Peter Pace*





# Fourth Generation Operations



Combat which combines elements of guerrilla tactics, terrorism, irregular warfare, insurgency and traditional warfare to target the will and morale of the enemy's support structure to achieve political victory

- Information Warfare only a portion of Information Operations
- Requires all tools of COCOM
  - Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic
- Includes all dimensions of warfare
  - Physical, Informational, Cognitive
- Currently ongoing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the world

## Principles of 4GO

Objective

Offensive

Mass

Economy of Force

Maneuver

Unity of Command

Security

Surprise

Simplicity

Restraint



Perseverance

Legitimacy

Population Perception



# Public Support of Troops in Vietnam





- Do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Vietnam?
- Solid line is fit for entire war – Dotted line is fit for 1965-1969
- $R^2 = 0.889$  :  $F = 120.46 > F_{16, \alpha=0.05} = 4.49 \rightarrow$  Adequate model

Data from Gallup Poll





# Public Support of Troops in Combat




Data from Gallop, ABC, CBS, and PEW

*Victory is the main object of war.*

*If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed – Sun Tzu*





# Summary of Time & Public Opinion



- Slope similar for Afghanistan, Iraq & Vietnam (1965-1969)
  - Public Support decreased 0.6% each month
- Vietnam (1965-1969) and Iraq have about the same initial support (y-intercept)
  - Same model of public support for Iraq & Vietnam for first 5 years of conflict

	Korea	Vietnam	Afghanistan	Iraq	Vietnam (1965-1969)
Y Intercept	48.55	60.12	90.04	66.40	66.26
Slope	-0.01086	-0.01265	-0.01801	-0.02070	-0.01853
R <sup>2</sup>	0.146	0.853	0.830	0.720	0.889
Number of Data Points	11	23	12	191	17
t Test of slope	-1.24	-11.02	-6.98	-22.06	-10.98
t Statistic ( $\alpha=0.05$ )	2.22 Fail to Reject	2.07 Reject	2.20 Reject	1.97 Reject	2.12 Reject


$H_0$  for  $t$  test was  $\beta_{\text{slope}} = 0$




Model :  $Public\ Support = 66 - 0.02 \cdot days\ into\ war$




# Mueller Model



- John Muller: *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*, 1973
- Related casualties to public opinion for Korea and Vietnam
- “Every time American casualties increased by a factor of 10, support for the war was dropped by about 15 percentage points”




Mueller: p 60






# Mueller Model Comparison



- 15% decrease of public opinion still valid
- As casualties increase, time increases



	Korea	Vietnam	Iraq
<i>Y Intercept</i>	114.46	124.98	110.80
<i>Slope</i>	-14.89	-16.51	-15.29
<i>R<sup>2</sup></i>	0.83	0.9	0.878
<i>Number of Data Points</i>	25	24	191
<i>t Test of Slope</i>	-5.35	-13.66	-22.06
<i>t Statistic (α=0.05)</i>	2.07 Reject	2.07 Reject	1.97 Reject


$H_0$  for  $t$  test was  $\beta_{\text{slope}} = 0$

Model :

$$\text{Public Support} = 110 - 15 \cdot \log_{10}(\text{casualties})$$



# Multiple Linear Regression




- Days into war and log of US casualties are significant
- Are other factors important?
  - # of US troops present (US)
  - # of daily attacks by insurgents (Attacks)
  - # of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
  - # of insurgents captured or killed (Insurgents)
  - # of foreign nationals taken prisoner
  - # of insurgents
  - % of foreign insurgents
  - # of British fatalities
  - # of Iraqi Civilians killed
  - # of Iraqi Military killed
- Model structure

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Public Support} &= \mathbf{x}' \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot x_1 + \dots + \beta_n \cdot x_n \\ &= \text{Intercept} + \text{coeff}_1 \cdot \text{factor}_1 + \dots + \text{coeff}_n \cdot \text{factor}_n \end{aligned}$$


*In war the chief incalculable is the human will – B. H. Liddell Hart*



# MLR Results



- Significant factors
  - Days into war
  - Log (Casualties)
  - # of Daily Attacks
  - # of Insurgents Captured



	Intercept	Days	Log (casualties)	Attacks	Insurgents
Coefficient	97.1151	-0.0473	-9.1137	-0.0344	0.0007
t test of $\beta$	24.18	-3.46	-5.37	-2.59	3.50
t Statistic = 1.97 ( $\alpha=0.05$ )	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject

Model

$$\text{Public Support} = 97.11 - 0.0473 \cdot \text{Days} \\ - 9.1137 \cdot \log_{10}(\text{casualties}) \\ - 0.0344 \cdot \text{Attacks} + 0.0007 \cdot \text{Insurgents}$$

$H_0$  for  $t$  test was  $\beta_{\text{slope}} = 0$




# Linear Regression Models




- Linear fit based solely on days not a good fit
  - No support: ~8.5 years
  - $R^2$  (goodness-of-fit) of other models is better
- MLR and  $\text{Log}_{(\text{cas})}$  models better represent the environment

	Iraq (Days)	Iraq ( $\text{Log}_{(\text{Cas})}$ )	Iraq (MLR)
$R^2$	0.720	0.878	0.888
Adjusted $R^2$	0.719	0.877	0.886
$F$ Test	486.68	1358	369.89
$F$ Statistic ( $\alpha=0.05$ )	3.89 Fail to reject	3.89 Fail to reject	2.42 Fail to reject





# Generalized Linear Regression




- Unifies both linear and non-linear techniques
- No requirement of normality and constant variance
- Only requires data to be in the exponential family
- Logistic Regression
  - Requires data to have binary  $[0,1]$  response
  - Survey data is appropriate: binomial
  - Model structure:  $E(y) = \frac{e^{x'\beta}}{1 + e^{x'\beta}} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-x'\beta}}$





# Logistic Regression Model



- Each factor has been shown to be significant
  - $\chi$  indicates goodness of fit (higher  $\rightarrow$  better)

	<i>Intercept</i>	<i>Days</i>	<i>Log (casualties)</i>	<i>Attacks</i>	<i>ISF</i>	<i>Insurgents</i>
<i>Coefficient</i>	2.44	-0.00092	-0.561	-0.00129	-5.47E-07	1.65E-05
<i>Std Error</i>	0.10	0.00030	0.039	0.00025	2.26E-07	3.97E-06
<i><math>\chi</math> Square</i>	659.3	9.4	212.7	26.1	5.8	17.2
<i>95% Lower CI</i>	2.25	-0.0015	-0.64	-0.0018	-9.90E-07	8.68E-06
<i>95% Upper CI</i>	2.63	-0.00033	-0.48	-0.0008	-1.04E-07	2.42E-05

- Deviance used to show goodness of fit
  - Difference between log-likelihood of fitted & saturated model
  - $\text{Dev} = 803 : \chi_{\alpha=0.05,185} = 225$
  - Model not adequate





# Model Adequacy



- Two reasons for high deviance \*
  - Incorrect factors
  - Overdispersion
- Transformed factors
  - Squared, log, exponential, & searched for other factors
- Reviewed residuals
- Convexity test for overdispersion^
  - Observed variance is greater than expected variance of factors
  - Plot is convex: overdispersion

$$C(p) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{p}{\hat{p}_i} \right)^{y_i} \left( \frac{1-p}{1-\hat{p}_i} \right)^{m_i - y_i}$$




\*D. Collett, Modelling Binary Data, page 194-5

^D. Lambert & K Roeder, "Overdispersion Diagnostics for Generalized Linear Models", Journal of the ASA, p 1225-1236




# Logistic Regression Results



- Used Williams method for fitting overdispersed binomials
  - Model is overdispersed (dispersion factor  $\Phi = 0.003627$ )


	<i>Intercept</i>	<i>Days</i>	<i>Log (casualties)</i>	<i>Attacks</i>	<i>Insurgents</i>
<i>Coefficient</i>	2.26	-0.00160	-0.486	-0.00151	2.41E-05
<i>Std Error</i>	0.19	0.00059	0.076	0.00054	8.14E-06
<i>χ Square</i>	155.5	7.4	41.5	7.8	8.8
<i>95% Lower CI</i>	1.9	-0.0027	-0.63	-0.0026	8.2E-06
<i>95% Upper CI</i>	2.62	-0.00045	-0.34	-0.0005	0.4E-06



$$\frac{\text{Model}}{\text{Public Support}} = \left( 1 + \frac{e^{0.486 \text{Log}_{(cas)}} e^{0.0016 \text{Days}} e^{0.00151 \text{Attacks}}}{e^{2.26} e^{2.41E-05 \text{Insurgents}}} \right)^{-1}$$



# Still Valid After the Surge?



- March 25<sup>th</sup>: 43% Support (Gallop)
- April 12<sup>th</sup>: 44% Support (CBS)
- April 15<sup>th</sup>: 41% Support (Gallop)
  - Average: 42.6%
- Model reports (Mid-April)
  - MLR: 42.5%
  - GLM: 42.8%




# Model of Combat and Public Resolve



AFETC

- Connects Blue Attrition to Blue Entropy
- Potentially represents population entropy






# Iraqi Public Opinion Survey



AL-FAHMAH




- Do you feel that Iraq is generally heading in the right direction or the wrong direction?
- Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion (World Public Opinion.ORG)

Percents based on responds with an opinion




# Conclusions



- Model of Iraq and first 5 years of Vietnam are about the same
- As casualties increase by an order of magnitude; the public support drops by 15% (Korea, Vietnam, Iraq)
- Constructed theoretical modeling framework of public resolve
  - Founded on empirical evidence of four key factors
    - $\text{Log}_{10}$  of Casualties
    - Days into war
    - Number of daily attacks by insurgents
    - Number of insurgents (captured / killed): only positive
- Provides a capability to evaluate impacts of conflict on public resolve
- Future research will connect public opinion to combat effects



# Back-up




Questions?






# Mueller Model with Iraq Data




- Still valid for Iraq





# Williams Procedure



1) Let overdispersion factor  $\phi=0$  and all weights  $w_i=1$ , evaluate the Pearson deviance ( $\chi^2$ )

of the saturated model, where  $Pearson\ Deviance = \chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{w_i (y_i - n_i \hat{p}_i)^2}{n_i \hat{p}_i (1 - \hat{p}_i)}$ .

2) Compare  $\chi^2$  with  $\chi^2_{(n-p)}$ . If  $\chi^2$  is unacceptably large, conclude  $\phi > 0$  and estimate

$$\hat{\phi} = X^2 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n w_i (1 - w_i v_i d_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^n w_i (n_i - 1) (1 - w_i v_i d_i)}, \text{ where } v_i = n_i p_i (1 - p_i) \text{ and } d_i \text{ is the } i^{th} \text{ diagonal}$$


element of the variance-covariance matrix.

3) Let the new weights be,  $w_i = (1 + (n_i - 1)\hat{\phi})^{-1}$  and estimate  $\beta$  and recalculate  $\chi^2$ .

4) If  $\chi^2$  is close to the degrees of freedom ( $n - p$ ) quit, else recalculate  $\hat{\phi}$  and return to step 3.



# What was the question?



- Public support based on polls from ABC, CBS, PEW & Gallop
- Investigated both support (those in favor) and opposed
- ABC asked: “All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war with Iraq was worth fighting, or not?”
- CBS asked: “Looking back, do you think the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or should the U.S. have stayed out?”
- PEW asked: “Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq?”
- Gallop asked: “In view of the developments since we first sent our troops to Iraq, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq, or not?”
- This is used by each organization to gauge if the population supports the war